Arafat Closing in on Dream

KAPRUN, AUSTRIA — Every Friday, millions of Israelis gather in front of their televisions to watch a popular puppet show modeled on the British TV masterpiece “Spitting Images.” The show mercilessly mocks various Israeli and Palestinian politicians. According to a recent opinion poll, the show’s favorite character strongly resembles Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader.

The poll’s results are suggestive of a larger development in Israeli society. Arafat’s rising popularity among Israelis is more than a mere reversal of attitudes. It is a psychological revolution: from most-hated and reviled enemy to admired winner in the latest round of peace negotiations.

Fifteen years ago, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the founding father of the right-wing Likud bloc, called Arafat a “two-legged beast.” Less than a year ago, just before the Israeli elections, Benjamin Netanyahu, Begin’s successor as party leader and now prime minister of Israel, referred to the Palestinian president as an “arch terrorist.” But last week, Netanyahu shook the hands of the “arch terrorist” and signed the Hebron accord, which puts Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank on a firm schedule.

“Arafat showed us,” admitted an Israeli participant in the negotiations, “not only how and why he is considered the greatest surviving leader on Earth and the best negotiator, but also he taught Netanyahu a fine lesson on how to handle the peace talks.”

Before and after the Israeli elections, Netanyahu had promised to “improve” upon the Oslo agreement negotiated, signed and implemented by the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In reality, however, Netanyahu signed an agreement that is an exact replica of the old one. The 400 Jews living in Hebron will have no more nor less security than they were supposed to have under the deal negotiated by the Labor Party, since 85% of the “city of the patriarchs” will be handed over to Arafat’s Palestinian Authority. Furthermore, Netanyahu agreed to withdraw Israeli troops from the West Bank, mostly rural areas, by September 1988, nearly a year earlier than he had wanted.

Arafat, on the other hand, “sold” Netanyahu “old” promises that he had already begun to implement: dismantling the terrorist infrastructure in the Palestinian-controlled areas of Gaza and the West Bank; scrapping--”this time, really scrapping”--the Palestinian covenant, which, among other things, calls for the destruction of the “Zionist entity,” and reducing the size of the Palestinian police and security services from 45,000 to the 18,000 allowed by the Oslo agreement.

Arafat’s “generosity,” according to Palestinian and Israeli security officials, is the direct result of his success at consolidating his role as the undisputed leader of his people, not only as past guerrilla leader of the armed struggle for a Palestinian state, but also as a modern statesman of a nation-in-the-making. Arafat’s mastery of two skills--the art of the threat and an ability to appease--has enabled him to outmaneuver his Palestinian rivals, namely the Hamas movement and smaller factions on his left, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Indeed, in an Arafat victory not widely reported in Israel or elsewhere, the Hamas leadership recently pledged to cease terrorist attacks against Israeli targets.

Had the fundamentalist group made such a promise a year ago, the Labor leader, Shimon Peres, would probably have won the elections. For it is widely assumed that Peres’ defeat resulted, in large part, from the wave of suicidal attacks carried out by Hamas terrorists on Israeli buses and shopping malls just months before the voting. In retaliation, the Israeli authorities denied most Palestinian workers entry into Israel’s rapidly expanding economy. The Israeli steps, underscored by strong rhetoric from Netanyahu’s Cabinet, drove the already-crippled Palestinian economy to the brink of collapse. Ordinary Palestinians blamed both Arafat and Hamas for their deepening misfortune.

For Arafat, it was a wake-up call. His security services, showing no sensitivity for human rights, cracked down on Hamas, putting hundreds of Hamas activists behind bars. The Hamas political and religious leadership, on the other hand, decided to adopt less radical policies, realizing that any other course might further erode their grass-root support among the masses. Thus was born the “cease-fire” agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.

It is, most probably, a temporary agreement allowing both sides to regroup and develop their political structures and build support. Regardless of motives, however, the Arafat-Hamas understanding also strengthens Netanyahu’s position. After many weeks of enduring strong criticism from Labor (“he is leading Israel to a new confrontation with the Palestinians”) and from within his own party, coalition and Cabinet, the Israeli prime minister can now tell the nation: The future is more promising. True, the Cabinet’s 11-7 vote endorsing the accord was not impressive. Gens. Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan, the former chief of staff, opposed him. Benny Begin, the science minister and son of the former prime minister, resigned in protest.

But these men are considered voices of the past. By reaching an agreement on Hebron and West Bank withdrawal, Netanyahu proved that he is distancing himself from his radical, extreme right-wing constituency and moving toward the political mainstream. No less important, Netanyahu is boosting his reelection changes in 2000 by bringing about what could amount to two years of relative stability and by making war less likely. Finally, his decision to sign no doubt will ease the tension between his government and Washington.

But, at the same time, the Hebron accord brings Arafat closer to realizing his 40-year dream of leading the Palestinian people to their promised land, while signaling to the Syrians that they, too, can secure a good deal from the the young Israeli leader if they can come up with the right combination of political stubbornness, military threats and psychological manipulation.*