What Peres Gave, Netanyahu Surpassed

In the weeks following Benjamin Netanyahu’s election last May, Palestinians close to the PLO’s No. 2 man Abu Mazen considered traveling to Washington to mobilize American support for the agreement Abu Mazen had reached with an Israeli minister--Yossi Beilin--in October 1995.

This detailed document, which outlined a final status agreement that included Palestinian sovereignty in most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was viewed by Palestinians in the weeks after Netanyahu’s victory as an acceptable compromise--one which they feared would remain feasible only if strong U.S. pressure were exerted on a recalcitrant Netanyahu government.

Today these same Palestinians insist that the Abu Mazen-Beilin agreement is dead, not because Netanyahu won’t accept it but because after dealing with the new Israeli government these past months. they believe they can force a better agreement.

Palestinians are not alone in concluding that the Netanyahu government has increased the potential for Palestinian gains as “final status” discussions begin. West Bank settlers are deeply concerned that the shortcomings Netanyahu has revealed in these last months pose a far greater danger to their future than a Peres-led or a national unity government.

“It’s ironic but true,” said Israel Harel, a veteran settlement leader “that we may have done better with Peres and Beilin than with Netanyahu because of his personality and his poor leadership. We’ll be lucky if we do as well as the Abu Mazen-Beilin [agreement].”

Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres himself has expressed similar concerns, warning of the need to “stop the unprecedented deterioration” that Netanyahu has precipitated in Israel’s regional and international position.

Both supporters and opponents list numerous Netanyahu shortcomings: his amateur handling of negotiations, poor staff work, the absence of a long-term vision, lack of consultation. While Israelis of all political persuasions bemoan these failings, Palestinians increasingly view them as providing opportunities to exploit for Palestinian advantage.

What most concerns Israelis and gratifies Palestinians is that Netanyahu has lost control of events.

The Oslo process under Rabin and Peres was inspired by Israel with the Palestinians as supplicants. Rabin frequently complained of Arafat’s “whining” and Peres described the Oslo diplomacy as one in which Israel “negotiated with itself”--unilaterally defining the principal elements of Palestinian autonomy. Until June 1996, implementation of Oslo was viewed by Israelis and Palestinians as fulfilling an Israeli agenda and executing a strategic Israeli vision of the future.

Netanyahu has all but squandered this advantage. Arafat is no longer portrayed in the Israeli press as a supplicant but as a wily negotiator capable of outsmarting Netanyahu and his minions. Not only has Netanyahu failed to command the direction and pace of diplomacy with the Palestinians, he has been forced to embrace a diplomatic process not of his own making.

It is true that these policies mark Netanyahu’s acceptance of the Oslo formula, acknowledging the existence of an Israeli national consensus prepared to live with the Oslo process. Yet because of Netanyahu’s weaknesses, the Hebron redeployment which was viewed during Labor’s tenure as another in a long line of Israeli successes, has been transformed into a tactical Palestinian achievement.

Thoughtful Palestinians are not alone in seeing the diplomacy since September as an important signpost in a strategic reconstruction in which the Oslo process has been transformed during Netanyahu’s brief tenure from an Israeli initiative principally designed to assure Israel’s interests into a vehicle for the creation of a Palestinian state on better terms than Labor was prepared to offer.

The Hebron agreement and the schedule for further redeployment were precipitated by September’s confrontations. Palestinians view the “mini-intifada” as both a diplomatic and military victory.

The September street battles in Gaza and the West Bank were the most important factor forcing Israel to resume the Oslo process. By proceeding in this fashion, Netanyahu violated one of Rabin’s principal negotiating guidelines: Palestinian violence, from any quarter, will not force Israeli concessions.

While this assessment of Israel’s shortcomings under Netanyahu’s leadership may create opportunities for Palestinians, it also poses dangers. First, the Oslo framework cannot easily be transformed from its origins. Arafat may have won the battle for Hebron but the agreement contains vital Palestinians concessions, not least among which are the continuing presence of 400 settlers controlling 20% of the city. The new schedule for “further redeployments” postpones by one year the formerly agreed upon schedule.

Perhaps most important is the growing chance for miscalculation that accompanies any policy involving the use of force. Should the Palestinian leadership conclude, on the basis of the Palestinian “victory” last September and Netanyahu’s myriad mistakes, that the IDF is a soft target, the possibility of a new and destructive conflagration becomes real.