MIDDLE EAST

NEW YORK — Nearly four years ago, President Bill Clinton hosted Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn to sign the Oslo accords. Today, only the Clinton administration can save the accords. Special envoy Dennis B. Ross’ recent trip to the Middle East eased some tension. But the active intervention of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright may be all that deters a new wave of violence.

The hope that was Oslo has evaporated. The only thing more dangerous than no peace talks is a half-birthed peace of unrealized expectations. Three years ago when I visited Gaza, there was optimism in the air as the veil of occupation lifted for 800,000 Gazans. Earlier this summer, I found only despair there.

Unquestionably, Arafat must end his “yellow light” approach to terrorism if Oslo is to have a chance of becoming reality. But deepening economic hardship caused by the halted negotiations--and, most recently, by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s illegal expropriation of revenues belonging to the Palestinian Authority--exacerbates Arafat’s already tenuous hold and further weakens Israeli security. With close to 60% unemployment in Gaza and the West Bank before the latest border closures, there’s barely an economy, only an inhuman and volatile landscape.

When I attended a meeting earlier this summer with Arafat and Palestinian Minister Nabil Shaath in Arafat’s Gaza seaside headquarters, the Palestinian leader appeared despondent and disoriented. It was worrisome. Even with all his imperfections, he is what stands between Israel and a militant Islamic regime.

Palestinian despair is nearly matched by the gloom in the Israeli peace camp. I can’t recall a similar feeling of discouragement in my many previous visits to Israel. I left 10 days before the suicide bombing in a Jerusalem marketplace killed at least 13, but even before this most recent terrorist act, Israelis seemed resigned to new, more lethal terrorist attacks. Few believed there could be calm without restarting peace talks. In fact, a low-grade war is occurring in Hebron, where Palestinian casualties are mounting (not to mention the rising number of skirmishes in southern Lebanon, with increasing Israeli casualties).

Unfortunately, terrorist incidents give Netanyahu more of an excuse to get out of Oslo. Indeed, many senior Labor Party leaders assume Netanyahu’s real intentions are to stall the process until the year 2000, when he thinks he can win reelection. A second Netanyahu term would make clear to the Palestinians that they must deal on his terms, goes the thinking.

In hindsight, it’s easy to see the flaws built into the Oslo process. But the premise of the accords--land for peace--is still the only game in town, and the United States must become a stronger player.

“The only side in this political power game that can influence both Israel and the Arabs is America,” Oslo architect Ron Pundak said in an interview. “We didn’t take as a realistic option a new government that doesn’t like the process nor the partner,” Pundak said, referring to Netanyahu and his government. Nor, apparently, did the Clinton administration.

The pivotal, and contentious, issue of Jewish settlements isn’t even mentioned in the accords. Yet, Oslo will go nowhere without a freeze on such settlements. This is the real test for Netanyahu--and, parenthetically, for Clinton. Netanyahu showed sound judgment when he acted swiftly to halt the Ras al Amud project in East Jerusalem. But there are more building projects on Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert’s planning boards, each with the potential to set off an explosion. Olmert says he is considering a challenge to Netanyahu for the Likud leadership, which means we can expect more provocations from the mayor.

Arafat claims that Rabin agreed to no settlement expansion and no government financing of settlements. Pundak backs him up. “With hindsight, I believe that one of the things that would have been better was a complete freeze on settlements, but the assumption was that there wouldn’t be a new government, and Rabin said there would not be new settlements.”

For Netanyahu, delivering on this pledge is tantamount to jeopardizing his own government, a high price to ask of any politician. The Netanyahu government is extremely weak. Before the marketplace bombings, Netanyahu’s popularity was under 30%. So far, the new Israeli election law has saved him, since opponents need 81 votes in the Knesset to topple him. But Israelis across the political spectrum, from Yossi Beilin on the left to Moshe Arens on the right, have called for amending this law.

By contrast, President Clinton is widely popular among Israelis. His words following the assassination of Rabin touched the nation. The bumper sticker Shalom Chaver (“goodbye friend”), which appeared on cars after the president spoke the words at Rabin’s funeral, is still seen all over Israel. It’s been joined by a bumper sticker that roughly translates to, “Friend, you are still missed.” It’s likely that Albright will have a similar impact on the Israeli public when she visits the region.

The question is whether President Clinton can--and will--pull Oslo out of the mud as a fitting tribute to his slain friend and to salvage an important foreign-policy initiative. As Pundak puts it: “Without America, there will be nothing. The American role is to enter in crisis, to manage the crisis and to allow the two sides to work together as honest brokers.”

Clinton must also confront Congress, where Netanyahu appears more popular than he is in his own Knesset. Clinton’s unwillingness, thus far, to challenge Congress’ desire to punish Arafat by withholding funding for the Palestinian Authority and by voting to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, when Jerusalem’s future is still negotiable, hurts the integrity of the process. Palestinian Minister Shaath rightly observes, “Congress has gone haywire. The Knesset would not have voted with such unanimity on Jerusalem as Congress did.”

Oslo has thus come down to a test of wills between Netanyahu and Clinton. For the peace of the region and America’s foreign-policy interests, it’s vital that the president rescue the Oslo process.